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Abstract
This paper provides empirical tests of hypotheses of cooperative be-
havior provided by evolutionary approaches in the resource-based view of
the ﬁrm. The inﬂuences of ”technological proximity”, individual incen-
tives to cooperate and managerial tools to the choice of research partner
are analyzed. Using German patent data we can show the positive in-
ﬂuence of those three determinants. The results of this paper conﬁrm
theories dealing with the path-dependency of research activities.
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11 Introduction
Since early 20th century views concerning ﬁrm development have been enlarged
in several dimensions. First, Schumpeter (1911) stressed innovation as driver
of change and economic growth and established a third economic growth fac-
tor besides labor and capital. His entrepreneur introducing new products into
the market ousts existing industrial structures in a manner called ”creative de-
struction”. Drawing on these Schumpeterian ideas, more recently the innovative
process has attracted intense research interest. Here, innovative activities, un-
derstood as the trail-and-error based creation and marketing of new knowledge
- then incorporated in new techniques, products and processes - are aﬀected by
strong uncertainty (Nelson & Winter 1982). Due to its inherent nature, this
new knowledge is fundamentally diﬀerent from traditional inputs (Dosi 1988).
As a consequence an actor developing new know-how is not able to internalize
it completely. Its tacit part is sticky to the ﬁrm, whereas the rest may spill over
to other actors in the economy. This latter eﬀect relies on the partly public
good nature of knowledge in the sense of Arrow (1962).
Secondly, nearly at the same time as Schumpeter Marshall (1920) established
the notion of ”industrial districts”, an conception that a ﬁrms development does
also depend her industrial environment. Further research on cluster develop-
ment, regional innovation systems and collective innovation have just been built
on these two lines of research. A constituent mechanism within these concep-
tions is ﬁrm cooperation in research and development, on a formal as well as
on an informal basis. In the past two decades this latter informal cooperation
has become a more and more observed phenomenon which lead to the notion
of innovation networks. Between market and hierarchical structure this institu-
tion is often a project-based collaboration of independent partners. Following
the stream of evolutionary economists (Nelson & Winter 1982, Dosi 1988, e.g.)
we consider this cooperative behavior, especially the choice of the cooperation
partner, as based on the participating ﬁrms assets of routines or resources de-
veloping over time.
Comparing recent literature, the motivations to start such a cooperation are
rather dispersed. Beside the existing well analyzed determinants of cooperative
behavior in the sense of who is cooperative or not (Combs & Ketchen 1999,
Miotti & Sachwald 2003, e.g.), in this paper we are interested in a major mo-
tive for the beginning of such an agreement or cooperation, the participation in
the partners tacit knowledge base. We are concentrating on the determinants
crucial for two partners coming together in such a research cooperation. Here,
technological overlap as a basis of a common technological understanding, reci-
procity as a prerequisite for knowledge exchange, and the expected value of a
research cooperation are the major determinants considered.
We proceed as follows. After an overview of the theoretical base of our
paper we will examine hypotheses concerning the determinants for cooperative
research. Section 3 presents the method applied and data base. Section 4 then
presents the regression results and suggests appropriate interpretations. Finally,
2we conclude our paper with a summary of the results and an outlook on the
future research to be pursued.
2 Literature survey
This paper analyzes determinants aﬀecting the choice of a research cooperation
partner. This section is devoted to a brief overview of recent literature in order
to derive hypotheses on the factors inﬂuencing and directing the search for a
research partner. I doing so the paper is based on the theoretical perceptions
of the resource-based view of the ﬁrm (RBV). This original Strategic Manage-
ment approach gives a number of useful insights into dynamic processes, like
cooperation agreements in the ﬁeld of research and development. After a brief
introduction to the RBV approach we will discuss research cooperations and
the three essential criteria they have to fulﬁl.
2.1 Resource-based view of the ﬁrm
During the last twenty years, mainly Strategic Management oriented scholars
have developed a resource-based framework for analyzing diﬀerences in ﬁrm
performances. In the beginning, papers on the resource-based approach mainly
focused on variables exogenous to ﬁrms inﬂuencing their competitive advantages
(Foss et al. 2001, p.7). Based on the oligopoly theory by Porter (1980) they
examined structural forces to the ﬁrm. Going back to its origins, this paper
draws on Andrew (1980) and the resource-based view of the ﬁrm (RBV) in a
close perspective.
Concentrating on the development of a single ﬁrm the resource-based view
of the ﬁrm is an ontogenetic approach. Drawing heavily on Penrose (1959)
a ﬁrm is treated as a collection of productive resources. Here resources are
deﬁned as ”those assets that are tied semi-permanently to the ﬁrm” (Wernerfelt
1984, p. 173). These resources can be assets fully appropriable, like equipment
or patents, or more of an intangible nature, like human capital capabilities
or ﬁrm routines (Silverman 1999, p.1110). An intangible asset also includes
knowledge of speciﬁc markets or customer groups, decision-making techniques
and management systems (Mowery et al. 1998, 508). An additional classiﬁcation
of productive resources refers to the distinction between static and dynamic
resources (Lockett 2001). As to the static ones, they are considered a given
stock of assets that can be utilized appropriately over a ﬁnite live time. Dynamic
resources, contrariwise, evolve over time and constitute for example the learning
capacity of a ﬁrm (Lockett 2001, p. 725) and thus can be used even more
intensely over time.
For analyzing cooperative behavior below, we mainly deal with more or less
intangible and dynamic productive resources of ﬁrms. We follow Combs &
Ketchen (1999) and Lockett (2001) that the RBV is based upon the assump-
tion that the sticky and hard to imitate resources determine the performance
of a ﬁrm (Barney 1991), that they are crucial for her competitive advantage,
3and that ﬁrms are aware of this relationship. Due to Combs & Ketchen (1999)
productive resources able to generate a sustainable advantage of the ﬁrm have
to satisfy three criteria. First, they have to be valuable, that is there exists a
demand side which appreciates the resources’ output. If those resources enable
a ﬁrm to produce a certain product with a higher quality, a group of customers
is required that is willing to pay the appropriate higher price. Secondly, an asset
must be rare to be considered a productive resource in the sense of the RBV.
Third, the resource has to be speciﬁc to a ﬁrm. Without a certain degree of
uniqueness a ﬁrm will not be able gain a competitive advantage over competi-
tors (Combs & Ketchen 1999, p. 869). This speciﬁcity of a productive resource
to the ﬁrm prevents easy imitation (Barney 1991). As a consequence, produc-
tive resources fulﬁlling these three criteria provide for distinctive competencies
(Andrew 1980, p.18) which themselves are often based on tacit knowledge and
capabilities diﬃcult to transform into tangible assets (Barney 1991). How do
ﬁrms built up such distinctive competencies? First, they engage in own R&D
activities and by this generate new knowledge which adds to their competi-
tiveness. Second, the RBV considers cooperative agreements between ﬁrms as
another option providing access to the speciﬁc productive resources of poten-
tial cooperation partners. Those cooperative agreements are of a speciﬁc kind
allowing the transfer and exchange of knowledge.
Teece et al. (1994) argue in this respect that market transactions of produc-
tive resources such as knowledge are the more diﬃcult to organize the higher
their degree of tacitness. Tacitness, of course, inhibits imitation - which pre-
serves innovation incentives - but it also prevents a deliberate and intentional
market based transferring of knowledge (Mowery et al. 1998, p.508). This prob-
lem of the failure or the not-existence of such ”markets for knowledge and ca-
pabilities” can be solved by the institution of (formal or informal) cooperative
agreements seen as devices between markets and hierarchies.
Framed by the RBV approach the institution of research cooperations as
voluntary agreements between independent actors can be analyzed in several
dimensions. In the next step we examine on the basis of the RBV three central
features a research cooperation has to fulﬁl in order to work: (i) a common tech-
nological understanding of the research partners, (ii) reciprocity as an incentive
to exchange knowledge, and (iii) experience in running cooperative research
projects. We will address these issues in turn.
2.2 Technological overlap in cooperative agreements
Drawing on the RBV a ﬁrms motivation to engage in a (research) cooperation
is to get access to the productive resources, here knowledge, of the partner,
who has a knowledge base diﬀerent to the own one. For those cooperations
to work two conditions have to be fulﬁlled: ﬁrst, the knowledge bases of the
potential partners have to be diﬀerent - otherwise nothing can be learnt (Mowery
et al. 1998, p.511); and secondly, the partners need to have the capability to
understand each other. The heterogeneity of the knowledge bases among the
(potential) cooperation partners accounts for both of these requirements.
4With respect to the required diﬀerences in knowledge bases the argument
runs as follows. Innovation is considered as being often the result of recombining
already existing knowledge. The opportunities for recombination depend on the
heterogeneity of the given knowledge base in the sense that the more diﬀerent
knowledge bases are the more new recombinations can be tried. Diversity and
diﬀerent knowledge structures augment the capability for making novel linkages
and emerging innovations (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, p.133). And with respect to
research cooperations, the learning eﬀect of a cooperation agreement is reduced
when ﬁrms want to absorb rather similar knowledge (Wersching 2005, p.3).
However, following Nooteboom (2000) this heterogeneity of the knowledge
bases in a research cooperation has to be suﬃciently small to allow an un-
derstanding of the cooperation partners. This implies that the access and the
internalization of the partners knowledge is rarely costless and usually requires
resources already existing in the acquiring ﬁrm (Barney 2001). Those costs,
learning costs, are the higher the more the cooperation partners diﬀer in their
respective knowledge bases. Assuming the more diﬀerent the knowledge bases
of research partners the higher these costs, the relation between heterogeneity
and cooperative agreements now is just contrary to the one above.
The reason for that is found in the relation between the existing knowledge
inside the ﬁrm and the outside knowledge to be acquired and the notion of ”ab-
sorptive capacities” introduced by Cohen & Levinthal (1990). Their approach
deals with learning capacities on the organizational level of the ﬁrm that go
beyond what any one individual can achieve (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, p.133).
Using cross-section data of the American manufacturing sector they ﬁnd that
the organizational absorptive capacity depends on former R&D expenditures
inside the ﬁrm. Thus, the capacity to evaluate and use external know-how is
largely a function of prior related knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, p.128).
The search for other knowledge which is in close relation to the own knowledge
endowment reduces the uncertainty aﬀecting the knowledge creating process
(Dosi 1988). And in a dynamic view, the close relationship between the accu-
mulating absorptive capacity of a ﬁrm and the knowledge she is able to acquire
leads to a (historically determined) path-dependency of productive resources as
emphasized by the RBV (Lockett 2001). Within this process a higher internal
knowledge base makes a ﬁrm more sensitive and more receptive for external
technological opportunities.
Taking these two arguments together we ﬁnd that while a suﬃcient degree
of technological overlap ensures communication, diversity and diﬀerent knowl-
edge bases increase the opportunities for establishing new linkages and for the
emergence of innovations (Cohen & Levinthal 1990, p.133). Thus, there exists
a trade-oﬀ between the better understanding of each other and the opportunity
of creating something new (Wuyts et al. 2005). We assume that ﬁrms are aware
of this problem when they are starting a research cooperation.
52.3 Incentive to cooperate
The impact of heterogeneity and technological overlap on cooperation probabil-
ity and success stress the two-sided learning capability on the one hand and the
potential of creating something new on the other. However, these requirements
for the structure of the knowledge bases are a necessary but not a suﬃcient
condition for the potential partners to have an incentive to engage in a research
cooperation.
When ﬁrms recognize cooperation potentials in the sense discussed above
what is their incentive to engage in a research cooperation when they, due to
the lack of an well established market for knowledge, cannot bill the partner
for providing access to their knowledge? It is the exchange of know-how which
is one key feature of a research cooperation agreement (Mowery et al. 1998).
Seen in this way, a cooperation is a form of a voluntary knowledge transmitting
process (Dosi 1988). Here, as both cooperation partners often (cooperation
with public research institutes are unfortunately neglected here) act as market
oriented ﬁrms, a cooperation needs to have a reciprocal incentive. Following
Fehr & G¨ achter (2000) reciprocal organizational types often emerge in markets
with incomplete contracts; the ”market of knowledge abilities” with the intrinsic
uncertainty is one example.
Thus, a cooperative agreement is no kind of an altruism oriented agreement.
The latter is characterized by one unconditional kindness, while in the former
both cooperation partner engage in order to achieve access to some of the part-
ners’ sticky knowledge (Fehr & G¨ achter 2000). Following the RBV approach
research cooperations are instruments achieving such accesses by reciprocity.
Fehr & G¨ achter (2000) describe cooperation as reciprocal in a way that both
partners are aware of the potential knowledge stock of the partner, but in order
to get access they have to open their own stock for the cooperation partner.
In addition, each cooperation partner will respond to friendly or hostile actions
of the partner as long as the cooperation is a voluntary collaboration (Fehr &
G¨ achter 2000, p.160). Following this, in a research cooperation the involved
actors have their speciﬁc incentive to engage in this cooperation. The involved
degree of reciprocity of the cooperation, however, does depend not only on the
amount of the individual incentives, but following Sadrieh & Verbon (2002) also
on the degree of inequality of these incentives. Actually their paper deals with
the impact of inequality on trust in a society. Bridging the gap to our research
topic on cooperation phenomena, they conclude that trust includes reputation
eﬀects, that again enhance cooperation (Sadrieh & Verbon 2002, p.2).
2.4 Organizational know-how
Following Levitt & March (1988) organizational learning as research cooperation
are target oriented and based on historical experience and stored in routines.
Drawing on Nelson & Winter (1982) these routines are ﬁrm speciﬁc resources
and is down to the competitive advantage. Concepts as ”learning by doing”
or ”learning by using” are based on experience from former actions (Prencipe
6& Tell 2001). A routine as Nelson & Winter (1982) described are dynamic
capabilities within an organization (Zollo & Winter 2002), that need a devel-
opment over time. Dealing actually with project-based ﬁrms Prencipe & Tell
(2001) examined the importance of accumulated experience for imitation inside
a project. We relate these ﬁndings on cooperative behavior as a project between
two independent actors. The participation and transfer, according to the former
statement, is described above as a core incentive for a ﬁrm to cooperate.
2.5 Hypothesis
The discussion above can be summarized in some testable hypotheses on the
probability of actors / ﬁrms to engage in a research cooperation.
The ﬁrst hypothesis dealing with the central question of this paper refers
to the technological overlap and thus the technological proximity between co-
operation partners. The two aspects of technological heterogeneity, cooperative
potential and degree of common understanding as discussed above, have to be
taken into account. First, to absorb external technological know-how both the
sender and receiver of this know-how must have a certain common knowledge
base. The larger this common base the better is the understanding which in
turn increases the probability of a common research project. This relationship
is formulated in the following hypothesis H1a:
H1a
With respect to a common understanding of potential
research partners, the higher the technological overlap
between them - compared to a sample of non-cooperating
actors - the higher the probability that these partners will
cooperate.
Second, however, ﬁrms looking for research partners face a trade-oﬀ. Be-
ing aware that novelty arises of the combination of diﬀerent know-how a high
degree of technological overlap between two ﬁrms reduces this potential and
thus reduces their willingness cooperate. Following this view the technological
knowledge used in a cooperation has to have a certain degree of heterogeneity.
Therefore, a ﬁrms choice of the cooperation partner includes the search of a
knowledge base complementary and not identical to the own knowledge base.
Hypothesis H1b refers just to this reasoning:
H1b
With respect to the innovative potential of a research
cooperation, the incentive to choose a partner declines with
the technological overlap between the partners becoming
too large.
Combining these two aspect of technological overlap, the incentive to engage
in a cooperation depends on the expected amount of knowledge transmitted
7within the cooperation. In addition, however, following the RBV approach
ﬁrms are willing to share their own knowledge in order to achieve that one of
the cooperation partner. Thus, it is also reciprocity which drives the incentive
to cooperate and therefore the degree by which the exchange occurs on rather
balanced terms. Hypothesis H2 combines this quantitative aspects of knowledge
exchange:
H2
The higher and the more balanced the potential knowledge
ﬂows between two ﬁrms are expected to be the higher is
the probability of a research cooperation between them.
Based on hypotheses H1a and H2 a cooperation between two independent
partners is based on a technological overlap for a better understanding and a
certain degree of reciprocity. Reciprocity here includes not only soft skills like
trust or fairness but also some valuable knowledge that each of the partner has
to oﬀer. A combination of both, the technological overlap and the reciprocity
of knowledge transfer, can be interpreted as the value of a cooperation. Coop-
erative agreements are more attractive if the value of the planned cooperation
is relatively high. Hypothesis H3 refers to this relationship:
H3
The probability of ﬁrms to cooperate increases with the
value of the prospective cooperation.
The organizational knowledge of how to manage a research cooperation is
built up from experience gathered in former cooperations. This may help coop-
erative ﬁrms to manage the problematic coordination of competencies and the
assignment of duties. Therefore ﬁrms are more likely to cooperate with each
other if a certain degree of experience in cooperating has been accumulated.
Hypothesis 4 represents this.
H4
Cooperation experience with a certain partner increases




In order to test the hypotheses above we use patent data information on ﬁrms
which applied to the German patent oﬃce between 1998 and 2003. Those appli-
cants, who have applied a patent together with a cooperation partner in 2003,
provide the basis of the paper. Using patent information for the years before
82003 allows us to characterize various technological relationships between ﬁrms.
This information is then used to analyze whether it is able to explain bilateral
cooperations starting in 2003.
We are careful with an interpretation of our results being aware of the prob-
lems that arise using patent data. These data are suited to characterize the
technological knowledge base inside a ﬁrm which might attract other ﬁrms for
cooperation. Two qualiﬁcations, however, are obvious here. First, patent data
do not represent the whole knowledge base of a ﬁrm, but they are a reason-
ably good indicator. In this sense patents satisfy the criteria Combs & Ketchen
(1999) have claimed for competitive relevant resources. They are supposed to
be rare, as well as valuable and speciﬁc in their nature. Therefore patent data
at least indicate the technological competitive advantages a ﬁrm has. Second,
other incentives inﬂuencing the choice of the cooperation partner likewise exist.
Because of our broad German-wide analysis we cannot include ﬁrm structure
variables as size, age or industry, it is acting in.
For taking account of the technological diﬀerences among ﬁrms we construct
a measure of their technological proximity. To obtain that measure we refer
to the technological ﬁelds listed in each patent. These ﬁelds are categorized in
accordance to the International Patent Classiﬁcation(IPC). IPC is a hierarchi-
cal system classifying technology by sections, classes, subclasses and groups. In
order to reduce the widespread IPC classiﬁcation with 7-digit classes we use a
concordance list developed by Schmoch et al. (2003) to convey the IPC clas-
siﬁcation into a NACE-code-oriented classiﬁcation, containing 43 technological
ﬁelds.
Using these 43 classes we construct indexes related to the technological prox-
imity between any two ﬁrms or actors in the sample, the technological overlap
TOand the reciprocity REC. In addition we set up dummy variables on several
dimension of the experience potential cooperation partners show in cooperating.
Figure 1 shows the time dimension of these variables.
Figure 1: Research concept
9The technological endowment of ﬁrm A in the database consists of her ac-
tivities in the n=43 technological ﬁelds i, i=1,...n (TA
i ) between 1998 and 2002
(see ﬁgure 1). As a measure for the capability to learn from each other, the
technological overlap TO in a research cooperation between ﬁrm A and ﬁrm B














It is twice the sum over all minimum activities of both partners divided by
the sum of all activities of both partners. This value increases with an enlarging
technological overlap and has a maximum of 1, which means that both partner
have totally the same knowledge endowment, then the two-sided absorptive ca-
pacities are maximal.
Reciprocity in a speciﬁc cooperation is given, if both (or all) partner own knowl-
edge or have competencies valuable for the other cooperation partner(s). Since
a cooperation is a project the partners are joining voluntarily, a two-sided in-
centive in the cooperation has to exist for starting this project.
For using patent data to capture incentives to cooperate we refer to litera-
ture arguing that cooperations are combinations of complementary assets. In
order to account for this we need to know about the complementarity of the
technology classes which required a more detailed analysis of the technology
classes involved. However, we leave this consideration for further research and
claim here that every patent and thus every knowledge new to the market is
(equally) valuable to a potential cooperation partner.
For constructing a measure of reciprocity we thus assume that the knowl-
edge a ﬁrm can oﬀer to a cooperation partner consists of the number of patents
(P), independently from technological ﬁelds, applied two years before the co-
operation (in the years 2000 and 2001). Firm A’s incentive RecB
A to cooperate
with ﬁrm B is the new knowledge inside the cooperation divided by the new










The potential knowledge that may be acquired is thus set into relation to the
given new knowledge inside the ﬁrm. The lowest value that indexcan take is 0
which is the case for both potential partners having to oﬀer no knowledge, that is
PA = PB = 0. The larger RecB
A the higher the incentive for A to cooperate with
B. An equivalent indexcan be computed for B. As reciprocity is a two-sided
variable, the individual incentives to cooperate have to be combined. Doing
this by computing the natural logarithm of the multiplied individual values we




In order to test hypothesis 3 a kind of ”cooperation value” (CV) is needed.
Therefore we designe a variable consisting of the multiplied values of TO and
REC.
CVA,B = TOA,B ∗ RECA,B (4)
This cooperation value includes the aforementioned trade-oﬀ between the
two-sided capabilities to internalize spillovers and tacit knowledge from the co-
operation partner on the one hand and the potential knowledge stock valuable
for the cooperation partner on the other hand.
Cooperation experience indicates a kind of organizational knowledge that
may positively inﬂuence the probability to cooperate. Diﬀerent cases of coop-
eration experience can be distinguished which will be represented by the use
of the three dummy variables SCOEX, BCOEX and OCOEX. In the ﬁrst
case the cooperation partners under concern may have already worked together
before. In that case the dummy variable SCOEX takes a value of 1, otherwise
zero. Secondly, experience in cooperation can be of a rather general type. Here
two scenarios are possible. If both partner have such experience, the dummy
variable BCOEX takes the value 1; if for only one partner has gathered coop-
eration experience, OCOEX will take 1. Thirdly, the cooperation considered is
just the ﬁrst one for both partners. In this case all three dummy variables take
the value of 0.
3.2 Data base
According to ﬁgure 1 we are interested in the formation of research cooperations
in the year 2003. In that year 765 German patent applicants assigned 1156
patents in cooperation with at least one other ﬁrm or institute. We dropped
foreign cooperation partners because the independent variables are based on
German patent application. Therefore a foreign ﬁrm will probably be accounted
against the reality as non-innovative before this cooperation.
The aim of the paper is to control whether and in which way the used
independent variables will determine the choice of the cooperation partner. As
the independent variable are values concerning a cooperation relation, we design
dyads of all possible cooperation constellations. In that case we take all ﬁrms of
the database willing to cooperate and to share their knowledge with a partner.
The key question of this paper is not to detect the determinants enhancing
cooperation activities, but to explore the choice of the partner. By analyzing
only cooperating ﬁrms the former research topic is excluded. Based on 765 ﬁrms
or institutes 292230 dyads are possible, including 472 cooperations which ﬁnally
got realized. We are aware of the fact that realized cooperation is a rare event
11Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
COOP TO REC CV BCOEX OCOEX SCOEX
Mean 0.002 0.079 1.795 0.136 0.524 0.400 0.002
Median 0.000 0.018 1.407 0.018 1.000 0.000 0.000
Maximum 1.000 1.000 8.011 8.011 1.000 1.000 1.000
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Std. Dev. 0.040 0.120 1.256 0.270 0.499 0.490 0.039
Observations 292230 292230 292230 292230 292230 292230 292230
and the overwhelming majority of over used variable COOP contains ﬁctive
cooperation constellations with COOP =0 .
The independent variable TO, representing the technological overlap of the
knowledge base between two potential cooperation partners, takes a value be-
tween 0 and 1. In most of the designed dyads it takes a value of zero (see left
chart in ﬁgure 2), that is there is no technological overlap between the two po-
tential partners considered. Even in the case of ﬁnally realized cooperations in
the right chart in ﬁgure 2, a couple of these cooperations have a non-overlapping
knowledge base. This will be discussed below.
Figure 2: Histogram of TO
Density TO (all) Density TO (only cooperation)
Comparing the two charts in ﬁgure 2 it is obvious and also expressed by
the higher mean value that in real cooperations the degree of the technological
overlap is higher than in the designed ﬁctive dyads. This is to be considered
a ﬁrst and only descriptive conﬁrmation of hypothesis H1a we will analyze in
more detail below. The variable REC indicates the two-sided incentive for a
certain cooperation. As natural logarithm of the multiplied individual value the
variable has a domain of zero to inﬁnite.
Comparing the overall mean value in the left chart in table 1 (1.79) with the
one for real cooperations in the right chart of ﬁgure 3 (1.96), there is no obvious
diﬀerence. On this descriptive and preliminary basis hypothesis H2 ﬁnds no
support.
Former cooperation experience is, as introduced above, represented by three
dummy variables. In more than half of all dyads both partners have such ex-
12Figure 3: Histogram of REC
Histogram REC (all) Histogram REC (only cooperation)
periences (see mean value of BCOEX in table 1). 211 of the 765 ﬁrms in the
data base have no cooperation experience, OCOEX = 0. The share of dyads
with no cooperation experience here amounts to 7.6%. The remaining cases in
which only one cooperation partner has cooperation experience applies to 40%
of all dyads. These variables shall indicate a sort of organizational knowledge
concerning cooperation experience. The highest level of experience in a dyad
is given, if these partners have had already a cooperation before the year 2003
(variable SCOEX). There have been 441 of such cooperations between ﬁrms
of the database or 0.2% of all dyads.
To show the relationship between all the variables to be used later their
correlations are computed. As a couple of variables in our analysis are Dum-
mies, we are aware of the problems using a correlation analysis. Nevertheless
because of the used metrical variables (REC and CV) we analyze the degree
of synchronism between the variables using such a correlation matrix, without
any further consideration of their magnitude.
Table 2: Correlation relation Statistics
COOP TO REC CV BCOEX OCOEX SCOEX
COOP 1.000
TO 0.048 1.000
REC 0.005 -0.030 1.000
CV 0.036 0.769 0.303 1.000
BCOEX 0.000 0.001 0.122 0.044 1.000
OCOEX 0.000 -0.002 -0.056 -0.021 -0.857 1.000
SCOEX 0.405 0.068 0.007 0.053 -0.001 0.001 1.000
Table 2 contains the correlation among all variables, the dependent and in-
dependent ones. Not surprisingly the highest amount of synchronism is between
TO-CV and between REC-CV. This obviously is a result of the design of the
cooperation value index. The most asynchronism is found between the former
cooperation dummy variables BCOEX and OCOEX. Even this is due to the
design of the variables. Former cooperation activities of ﬁrms in a dyad seems
13to have a high inﬂuence on a further cooperation agreement in 2003.
3.3 Operationalization of the concepts
The aim of this paper is to analyze the determinants for the choice of the
cooperation partner. We therefore design dyads of ﬁrm as mentioned above.
The hypotheses are tested on the dummy variable COOP which states whether
a ﬁrm is engaged or not in a respective cooperation in 2003. All analyses apply
a Logit-analysis to identify the impact of the independent variables.
Hypotheses H1a and H1b on the impact of the technological overlap on the
probability to cooperate are tested by equations 5 and 6. Equation 5 estimates
the linear inﬂuence of the technological overlap TO.
PCoop = β0 + β1 ∗ TO (5)
To sustain hypothesis H1a the estimated coeﬃcient has to be positive. Hy-
pothesis H1b claims a invert-U relation between COOP and TO. Therefore in
equation 6 the squared overlap index squTO is included:
PCoop = β0 + β1 ∗ TO+ β2 ∗ squTO (6)
For the claimed invert-U relationship the coeﬃcient of the linear term β1
has to stay positive, whereas the coeﬃcient of the squared term β2 has to take
a negative value.
Hypothesis H2 is on the cooperation incentive as given by the reciprocity
REC inﬂuencing the cooperation probability. The coeﬃcient value β1 of the
estimation in equation 7 has to take a positive value to conﬁrm the second
hypothesis:
PCoop = β0 + β1 ∗ REC (7)
The inﬂuence of technological overlap and reciprocity for the partner choice
(TO and REC) is estimated in equation 8 in order to explore the additional
explanatory power reciprocity has on the cooperation probability:
PCoop = β0 + β1 ∗ TO+ β2 ∗ squTO + β3 ∗ REC (8)
To test hypothesis H3 on the inﬂuence of the cooperation value we use equa-
tion 9. If the variable CV enhances the probability of a research cooperation,
the coeﬃcient has to be signiﬁcantly positive:
PCoop = β0 + β1 ∗ CV (9)
14The last hypothesis to be tested is on former cooperation experiences. Be-
sides the variables used in the regressions above, the three dummy variables
concerning cooperation experience are included:
PCoop = β0 + β1 ∗ TO+ β2 ∗ squTO + β3 ∗ REC+
β4 ∗ BCOEX + β5 ∗ OCOEX + β6 ∗ SCOEX (10)
As mentioned above four levels of prior experience are possible. If the co-
eﬃcients of all three dummy variables are insigniﬁcant cooperation between
inexperienced partner are as probable as cooperation of experienced partners.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Technological overlap
This subsection shows the results of the coeﬃcient estimation on the techno-
logical overlap in the cooperation dyads. Table 3 presents coeﬃcients and their
p-values concerning hypothesis H1a (R1a)and hypothesis H1b (R1b) respec-
tively.
Table 3: Regression results hypothesis 1
R1a R1b











McFadden R2 0.053 0.0534
(p-value in parenthesis)
Testing the inﬂuence of technological overlap on the probability to coop-
erate (R1a) the coeﬃcient of TO (4.444) is signiﬁcantly positive. Therefore,
hypothesis H1a can be conﬁrmed. The explanatory power of this regression
with only one independent variable is acceptable with a McFadden-R2 value
of 0.053. The closer the knowledge bases between two ﬁrms the higher is the
probability that they establish a research cooperation. This result corresponds
with recent ﬁndings (Mowery et al. 1998, Sorenson et al. 2005, Woolthuis et al.
2005). A small technological distance, that is a high technological overlap, en-
hances the cooperation probability. Thus, ﬁrms chose their cooperation partner
in their technological environment. This fortiﬁes the statements about the ab-
sorptive capacity theory as well as the resource-based view of the ﬁrm. As
15stated in hypothesis H1b, a too close technological proximity leads to an invol-
untary knowledge ﬂow. Contrary to theoretical results and empirical ﬁndings
the coeﬃcient of the squared technological overlap degree squTO has a signif-
icant positive value (β2 =1 .1). Probably this is due to distribution of TO in
our data base. Although the whole range between 0 and 1 is covered by our
data, the magnitude of the overwhelming majority, even of real cooperations, is
below 0.5. Additionally, the McFadden-R2 of 0,0534 remains at the same level
as in regression R1a (0.053). If there exists a critical distance in the sense that
the ﬁrms are too close in their knowledge base this cannot be observed for our
data. Our results therefore do not conﬁrm hypothesis H1b.
4.2 Reciprocity
In the former set of regressions the impact of the two-sided understanding be-
tween ﬁrms for cooperative activities has been analyzed. This ability to learn
from each other says nothing about the potential knowledge that can be trans-
ferred. Hypothesis H2 claims that the higher the potential bilateral knowledge
ﬂow the higher the probability to cooperate. Regression R2a in table 4 tests
for this. Following the estimated coeﬃcient (0.096) a higher reciprocity value
enhances the probability of a cooperation substantially.
Table 4: Reciprocity impact on cooperation probability
R2a R2b













McFadden R2 0.054 0.055
(p-value in parenthesis)
The estimation R2b includes all variables used so far. Again hypothesis H1a
and H2 can be conﬁrmed. Both the technological proximity between cooperation
partners and an increasing degree of reciprocity enhance the likelihood of a
research cooperation.
4.3 Cooperation value
In hypothesis 3 we argue that the combination of both already used independent
variables also enhance the cooperation probability. In table 5 we test whether
16there exists a general linear impact of the cooperation value on the choice of a
cooperation partner.









Not surprisingly in accordance with the regression results above, the coop-
eration value (coeﬃcient = 0.998) is enhancing the likelihood between two ﬁrms
to cooperate. The trade-oﬀ often mentioned in recent literature between the
ability to learn from each other and the potential pool of knowledge that can be
transferred inside the cooperation can be solved by using this simple variable.
Of course, there are real cooperations with a lower technological overlap, but a
higher degree of reciprocity. Because of the signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimated in
regression R3 hypothesis H3 can be conﬁrmed for our data.
4.4 Former cooperation experience
The organizational capabilities within a cooperation shall facilitate the knowl-
edge exchange between the cooperation partner and shall enhance the prob-
ability of a successful cooperation. The corresponding regression results are
presented in table 6.
Neither the cooperation experience of one nor of both cooperation partner
in general (regression R4a and R4b) enhances the probability of a cooperation
between those two partners. If both cooperation partners have had a former
common research project, this increases the probability of a further cooperation
(regression R4c).
There seem to be speciﬁc routines required in every cooperative relation.
General knowledge of ”how to manage” a cooperation project does not exist
or does not inﬂuence the choice of the research partner. Probably because of
the knowledge base developed collectively dyads with a former cooperation re-
lation choose their recent partner because of the technological overlap. This
latter variable becomes a insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient with including SCOEX as an
independent variable. In other words the technological overlap between these
cooperation partners is due to the common research of the past (regression R4d).
Moreover including former research relations to explain the choice of the coop-
eration partner increases the explanatory power. While the regression without
former cooperation relations explain around 5% of all cooperations, this value
17Table 6: Former cooperation impact on cooperation probability
dep. var. coop. coop. coop. coop.













































McFadden R2 0.055 0.055 0.276 0.276
(p-value in parenthesis)
increases with including this Dummy variable to a value of 27.6%.
Recapitulating, with regard to the regression results we can conﬁrm hypothe-
sis 1a, an increasing technological overlap enhances the probability of a research
cooperation. Also hypothesis 2 is approved for the given data base, the higher
the two-sided incentive to cooperate the higher the likelihood of a cooperation.
The acceptance of the two former hypotheses leads to conﬁrming the third hy-
pothesis concerning the cooperation value solving the trade-oﬀ between overlap
and reciprocal incentive. Former cooperation experience as a ﬁrm speciﬁc rou-
tine doesn’t enhance the likelihood to cooperate. Two ﬁrms where at least one
partner has such experience are not more likely to cooperate, with exception of
a former cooperation between those two ﬁrms. The special case, that both have
cooperation experience with each other, increases the probability to cooperate
in a research project.
5 Conclusion
The phenomena of research cooperation inspired diﬀerent ﬁelds of the research
community. This paper analyzes the determinants inﬂuencing the choice of the
cooperation partner. In doing so we presume that to start a research cooperation
between two ﬁrms three criteria have to be fulﬁlled. First, the knowledge base
of the two ﬁrms has to have a certain degree of overlap. This common knowl-
18edge base enhances the better understanding of each other and eases the aspired
knowledge transfer between them. Second, the knowledge transfer logically re-
quires a certain stock of knowledge that is valuable for the other cooperation
partner. A two-sided incentive has to exist for both partners to start such a
voluntary agreement knowing that partly their own sticky knowledge will be
transferred to the cooperation partner. As third criteria we conjecture a certain
degree of organizational knowledge on how to manage such a research coopera-
tion.
Using German patent data we have analyzed determinants inﬂuencing the
choice of the cooperation partner. We can show that for German cooperative re-
lations the technological overlap of the potential cooperation partners enhances
the probability that they cooperate in the year 2003. This ﬁnding is in a line
with the results of recent literature (Mowery et al. 1998, Sorenson et al. 2005,
e.g.). While Mowery et al. (1998) hypothesize an invert-U relationship between
the likelihood to cooperate and the technological overlap, we cannot approve
this result in our data.
Beside a given degree of understanding an incentive to cooperate has to
be given for all cooperation partners. High-value knowledge as an indicator
enhances the attractiveness of a ﬁrm to become a cooperation partner. Both
partners have to oﬀer such values.
Recent literature stresses a trade-oﬀ relation between the two criteria. By
using the cooperation value as a combination of both criteria we ﬁnd this trade-
oﬀ to be resolved. Organizational learning literature stresses on the importance
of cumulative experience increasing the recent activity. Concerning the rou-
tine ”cooperation” we cannot conﬁrm that experience in how to manage such a
project in a dyad enhances the probability of being cooperative. However, this
kind of knowledge enhances the likelihood to start a further cooperation with
the same partner.
Being aware of the disadvantages using patent data, in our opinion we ﬁnd
meaningful results underlining the necessity of a certain degree of technological
homogeneity among the cooperation partners. Beside deepening the existing
recent literature the ﬁndings can explain phenomena in other ﬁelds of cooper-
ation research. For example an extreme degree of heterogeneity in a regional
network can explain very scarce connectivity between the actors, although spa-
tial proximity as an other proximity dimension (Boschma 2005) is given. This is
one possible dimension we can enlarge the analyzes. But ﬁrst of all, we want to
combine these ﬁndings with micro-data of ﬁrms in order to explain the inﬂuence
of being cooperative on the economic success more deeper than recent literature
has done.
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